Enforcement

Can an Association Create and Enforce Rules that Only Apply to Children?

Published on: October 1, 2019 | by Steven J. Tinnelly, Esq.

*Asked & Answered

Asked – Our Association is seeking legal guidance regarding children playing in the common areas and driveways. Several homeowners have complained about the number of children playing without supervision. Drivers report their concern for the children’s safety as there have been several reports of children almost hurt. The Board would like to know if they have the authority to restrict children from playing in the common areas and/or driveways?

Answered – The short answer is that the Association would be exposing itself to a risk of liability under federal and state anti-discrimination laws by adopting a rule or policy that outright prohibited children from playing in the common areas; including the streets and driveways. This risk would extend to other rules that specifically apply to children only, as opposed to all members/residents of the community.

Generally, an association should proceed with caution when attempting to create and/or enforce rules that specifically apply to children. Federal and state law provides that it is unlawful to limit the use of privileges, services, or facilities associated with a dwelling because of familial status (the law also recognizes other protected classes including those based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, and disability). Familial status is generally defined as having one or more individuals under 18 years of age who reside with a parent or with another person with care and legal custody of that individual. The effect of association rules based on familial status is that families with children, and those children, are treated differently and less favorably than households comprised solely of adults.

Federal courts have found that an association engages in actionable discrimination when rules specifically target children without sufficient justification. For example, rules that restrict only children from the benefits and privileges of common areas or amenities (such as pools, parkways, streets, etc.) have been struck down as impermissible restrictions against a protected class; namely familial status.

An association pool rule that restricts children under the age of 16 from using the pool without adult supervision would be an example of an impermissible rule. An association may argue that such a rule is intended to protect children. However, it would be easy to demonstrate that many children that fall under the scope of the rule are far more proficient swimmers than many adults (e.g. junior lifeguards). However, a rule that prohibits children under 5 from using the common area spa without adult supervision would likely fare better if a legal challenge was brought because there is a clear and identifiable safety risk with children under 5, regardless of swimming proficiency. Specific adult-only swim hours would be another example of an impermissible rule.

To avoid the risk of a discrimination claim, associations should strive to craft and enforce rules that apply equally to all members and residents within a community. Facially neutral rules of general applicability are far more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny. Alternatively, if an association has a legitimate and compelling justification for a rule that only applies to children (or other protected class), the rule must be the least restrictive means to accomplish the identified goal. This is a high burden to meet, so counsel should be consulted to avoid unnecessary and costly issues down the road.

Associations should be aware that creating and/or enforcing rules that apply only to children (and other protected classes such as race, color, national origin, religion, sex, or disability) exposes an association to federal and state discrimination claims. Associations seeking to address legitimate concerns or issues, such as children’s safety, should work with counsel to create enforceable rules that steer clear of potential discrimination against protected classes.

-Blog post authored by TLG Attorney, Tim D. Klubnikin, Esq.

THOU SHALT NOT REMOVE THE MEZUZAH: California Legislature Enacts SB 652 to Protect Displays of Religious Items on Doors and Doorframes

Published on: August 15, 2019 | by Steven J. Tinnelly, Esq.

*New Legislation

On July 30, 2019, SB 652 was signed into law by Governor Gavin Newsome in response to several incidents in which a homeowner’s association (HOA) asked a resident to remove a mezuzah from their unit’s entry door or doorframe. A mezuzah is a small scroll that is affixed to the doorframe of Jewish homes to fulfill the mitzvah (Biblical commandment). For observant Jews, this is not a choice, but rather, a religious duty. Attempts to bar them from fulfilling this duty violated their religious freedom, argued Jewish residents.

In Connecticut, an HOA threatened to fine a resident fifty ($50) dollars if she did not remove the mezuzah affixed to her doorframe. The HOA permitted religious displays (e.g. Christmas wreaths) on doors, but restricted any adornments from being placed on exterior walls. The HOA argued that doorframes are considered exterior walls.

In Florida, an HOA ordered a resident to remove a mezuzah, citing its bylaws prohibiting owners and occupants from attaching, hanging, affixing or displaying anything on the exterior walls, doors, balconies, railings and windows of the building.

In New York, an HOA fined a resident fifty ($50) dollars for affixing a mezuzah to her doorframe shortly after she moved in. The HOA cited its bylaws prohibiting residents from altering the exterior of their home without approval from the Association. The rule included affixing of signs, advertisements or statuary.

While there were only a handful of instances nationwide in which a resident was asked to remove a mezuzah, the bill was designed to have a broader scope in protecting any displays of religious items on doors and doorframes so long as the display reflects “sincerely held religious beliefs.” Specifically, SB 652 prohibits a “property owner” (defined to mean an HOA, an HOA board, or landlord) from adopting or enforcing any rule that prohibits the display of one or more “religious items” on an entry door or doorframe. The bill defines “religious item” to mean any item displayed “because of sincerely held religious beliefs.” The bill also identifies reasonable exceptions, such as allowing an HOA or landlord to prohibit the display of anything that threatens public health or safety, violates existing law, contains obscenities, hinders the opening or closing of any entry door, or is larger than 36” by 12” inches. Also, an HOA may require a separate interest owner to remove a religious item as necessary to perform maintenance on a door or doorframe.

Prior to SB 562, federal and state law provided some protections against religious discrimination in housing, but the author of the bill believed that these protections were not sufficient enough to protect the display of religious items. For example, the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibits housing discrimination on the basis of religion. Likewise, the state Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) makes it unlawful for the owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate against or harass any person because of the religion of that person. (Gov. Code § 12955.) The Davis-Stirling Act, which regulates homeowner’s associations and common interest developments, contains a provision that prohibits the HOA governing documents from prohibiting the posting or displaying of noncommercial signs, posters, flags, banners, on or in an owner’s separate interest, subject to certain exceptions. (Civil Code § 4710.) To the extent that a “religious item” is a sign, poster, flag, or banner, one could argue that existing law already prohibits an HOA from adopting or enforcing any rule that bans the display of religious items. But arguably there is a question of whether a mezuzah or cross hung from a door is a “sign.” SB 562 eliminates that ambiguity by protecting any “item” which is displayed because of a sincere religious belief, whether or not it is a “sign.”

SB 652, which takes effect January 1, 2020, will likely conflict with many HOA policies, which have aesthetic and architectural rules that bar hanging anything on an entry doorframe. According to the author of the bill, such restrictions from HOAs leave the affected people unable to freely practice their religious obligations and in some instances are forced to leave their residence and seek another place to live. By passing this bill, California’s legislature has followed the recent trend in caselaw suggesting that the religious freedom of individuals should take precedence over the communal interests of homeowner’s associations.

Notwithstanding, it is important to note that the right afforded to HOA members and tenants in this bill is extremely limited, only applying to a “religious item” and, even then, only when the item is posted on an entry door or doorframe. For instance, the bill would not provide protection to an owner who wanted to post a similarly-sized religious item in a window, or a door other than an “entry” door.

-Blog post authored by TLG Attorney, Reuben D. Kim, Esq.

Workplace Harassment in a HOA Environment

Published on: April 18, 2019 | by Steven J. Tinnelly, Esq.

*New Library Article!

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Workplace harassment and hostile work environments are nothing new for management professionals. Emotionally charged conversations can become uncomfortable and antagonistic for many managers. Unfortunately, such dialogue frequently crosses the line from demanding direction to demeaning personal attacks.

Previously, employer liability for employee claims based on nonemployee conduct was generally limited to sexual harassment. Effective January 1, 2019, newly adopted California law (Senate Bill 1300) lowers the burden by which California employees can bring successful harassment claims against California employers and expands the scope by which those employers may now be responsible to their employees for third party, nonemployee conduct, among other things.

Our HOA attorneys have authored a new article to generally summarize SB 1300 and to discuss its application to common interest development practice.

The article, entitled “Workplace Harassment in a HOA Environment,” is available for download from our firm’s library. You can access the article by clicking here.

Courts Will Defer to the Decisions of Boards Based on Good Faith and Regard for the Best Interests of the Community

Published on: March 5, 2019 | by Steven J. Tinnelly, Esq.

agriculture-berries-bunch-760281-e1551829548999 In Eith v. Ketelhut (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 1, a homeowners association featuring estate properties where members maintain fruit orchards and vineyards yielding fruit that can be made into wine and offered to the public for sale required the Board of Directors (“Board”) to determine if sale of products made from fruit produced on the property is a prohibited business or commercial activity under the CC&Rs. Looking to the purpose of the prohibition – to protect the residential character of the community – the Board examined whether the activity negatively impacted the residential character of the community.

In 2003 the Ketelhuts received approval from the Los Robles Hills Estates Homeowners Association’s (“HOA”) Architectural Committee (“Committee”) to plant landscaping on their property which included a vineyard of 600 plants. The Committee approved the Ketelhuts’ vineyard as it had approved other members’ avocado and fruit trees. The Ketelhuts did not mention using the grapes to make wine for sale. Five years later in 2008 the fruit was harvested and removed to an off-site winery to be made into wine. The Ketelhuts commenced a wine business in 2009, obtaining the necessary licenses, and began selling wine in 2010 over the Internet to the public and local restaurants and hotels. The Ketelhuts characterized the vineyard as a hobby, but they filed forms with the IRS claiming the vineyard as a “business.”

Eith and other neighbors demanded the Ketelhuts cease operating a commercial vineyard, so the Board investigated the Ketelhuts’ vineyard operation. The Board determined that the vineyard did not constitute business or commercial activity prohibited by the CC&Rs, because there was no negative impact on the community. No wine was produced or stored on the property, there was no tasting room drawing retail traffic to the community, and the wine was sold over the Internet to the public and local restaurants and hotels and shipped from an off-site warehouse.

Eith and other neighbors sued the Ketelhuts for operation of the vineyard as a prohibited business or commercial activity in violation of the HOA’s CC&Rs. The trial court elected not to decide whether the operation of the vineyard was a prohibited business or commercial activity, but to find in favor of the Ketelhuts by applying the rule of judicial deference adopted by the California Supreme Court in Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Assn. (1999) 21 Cal.4^th 249 (“Lamden”) to the Board’s decision that the vineyard was not a prohibited use based “upon reasonable investigation, in good faith and with regard for the best interests of the community association and its members.”

The neighbors appealed the decision in favor of the Ketelhuts to the California Court of Appeal, which confirmed the trial court’s application of the judicial deference rule in the Lamden case stating, “Common interest developments are best operated by the board of directors, not the courts.” The Court of Appeal further concluded that the Board correctly interpreted the CC&R prohibition of business and commercial activity. The purpose of the prohibition was to protect the community’s residential character; therefore, the prohibition does not encompass activity that has no effect on the community’s residential character.

The Board was in a much better position than the courts to evaluate the vineyard’s effect on the community and found that the residential character of the community was not impacted as a result of the growing and picking of the grapes on the property. No business or commercial activity of making and selling wine occurred on the property and offering the wine for sale over the Internet did not transform use of the property into a prohibited business or commercial activity. At all times the operation of the vineyard was fully consistent with residential use.

-Blog post authored by TLG Attorney, Terri A. Morris, Esq.

Recent California Court of Appeal Ruling Limits Anti-SLAPP Protection for Actions by Board of Directors

Published on: February 13, 2019 | by Steven J. Tinnelly, Esq.

*Unpublished Opinion

The recent unpublished opinion of Chemers v. Quail Hill Community Association et al. (2018) shines some light on the oft-misunderstood California Anti-SLAPP statute and its effectiveness as a defense for actions by a homeowners association’s board of directors. The Fourth District California Court of Appeal held that certain actions by the board in a dispute with a director were not in furtherance of the right of free speech or petition as to be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.

Plaintiff Evan Chemers (“Chemers”) was a member of the board of directors for defendant Quail Hill Community Association (“Quail Hill”), a planned unit development located in Irvine, California. A series of disagreements and escalating tension between Chemers and other members of the board resulted in the board taking affirmative steps to remove Chemers from the board permanently. In June 2016, the board proposed a resolution to create an executive committee consisting of all board members except for Chemers, and in July 2016, the board proposed a resolution to declare Chemers’ board seat vacant on the ground that he did not meet the member-residency requirement. Chemers was not afforded an opportunity to present any evidence of residency, address the board, or have his legal counsel present when he was formally removed.

In October 2016, Chemers filed a lawsuit against the association and other directors, alleging eight causes of action including breach of governing documents, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, declaratory relief, and various violations of the Civil Code and Corporations Code. In response, the defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion seeking an order striking the complaint and the eight causes of action within it. The trial court granted the moving defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to six of the eight causes of action.

Chemers subsequently appealed the trial court’s decision, and the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred by granting the anti-SLAPP motion as to the claims alleged against Quail Hill for breach of contract, violation of Civil Code section 5850 et seq., and for two counts of declaratory relief. The Court of Appeal reasoned that none of those four causes of action arose out of protected activity – whether speech or petitioning activity – within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.

Regulation of Noisy Vehicles within the Community

Published on: October 16, 2018 | by Steven J. Tinnelly, Esq.

*Asked & Answered

Asked – We have several vehicles that are “extremely loud” due to their exhaust systems. Even with all windows and doors closed and these vehicles 1/2 way across the complex, there is NO PROBLEM hearing them when they start them. They even set off car alarms near them. Can we ask them to address the noise they cause?

Answered – Noisy neighbors are a frequent occurrence in common interest developments, especially in dense housing communities (e.g., condominiums). And while the California Supreme Court has indicated that individuals “in a community must put up with a certain amount of annoyance, inconvenience and interference,” (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 937), that does not extend to situations which have a substantial impact on residents’ use and enjoyment of their separate interests.

Indeed, residents of a common interest development are generally entitled to the peaceful use and enjoyment of their respective separate interests as well as the common areas. Ensuring such peaceful use and enjoyment is what underlies many of the provisions set forth in an association’s recorded Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (“CC&Rs”). Residents purchase or rent their separate interests within an association in reliance on those restrictions being consistently and faithfully enforced.

The peaceful use and enjoyment to which residents are entitled is typically reflected in the association’s CC&Rs under the heading “use restrictions.” The following is a common example of a use restriction preserving the right of residents to the peaceful use and enjoyment of their separate interest:

No Condominium shall be used in such a manner as to obstruct or interfere with the enjoyment of occupants of other Condominiums or annoy them by unreasonable noises or otherwise, nor shall any nuisance be committed or permitted to occur in any Condominium.

This provision, alone, can serve as a basis to prevent residents from operating vehicles in the community that are “extremely loud.” However, some associations go a step further and adopt operating rules identifying what constitutes an “unreasonable” noise. For example, an association may adopt an operating rule prohibiting residents from operating vehicles that exceed a certain decibel level; or, more commonly, adopt an operating rule prohibiting residents from operating vehicles that produce “excessive” noise thereby providing the Board of Directors with the broad discretion to determine what constitutes “excessive.”

In sum, the ability to regulate conduct or activities that constitute a nuisance is well within the scope of authority granted to an association. This power extends to prohibiting residents from operating extremely loud vehicles within the community. Associations facing such issues can and should commence enforcement efforts to remedy the violation, and, if the association has not done so already, adopt operating rules addressing such conduct.

Content provided by TLG attorney Matthew T. Plaxton, Esq.

To submit questions to the HOA attorneys at Tinnelly Law Group, click here.

Should an Association Respond to Unofficial Publications?

Published on: August 28, 2018 | by Steven J. Tinnelly, Esq.

*Unpublished Opinion

With increasing frequency, homeowners associations are confronted with members publishing content related to their association and its operations, whether on Facebook, blog posts, or other various online forums. Sometimes these publications are critical of the association board of directors, misrepresent important information and facts, or fraudulently purport to be official association publications. The various potential issues associated with member publications are seemingly endless, but California courts periodically provide clarity regarding issues that can arise in the context of member/association publications. The recent unpublished opinion of Kulick v. Leisure Village Association (2018) arose out of the publication of such member content and provides insight into how courts view and address some of these issues.

The Kulick case involved two separate lawsuits between a homeowner (“Kulick”) and his homeowner’s association (“Association”), the Association’s board of directors (“Board”), and the Association’s attorneys. Kulick, a long-time resident with a history of conflict and grievances against the Association, anonymously published and circulated newsletters (“Newsletters”) within the community in violation of the Association’s rules and regulations prohibiting anonymous publications. Kulick’s anonymous Newsletters were frequently critical of the Association Board.

The Association successfully filed suit against Kulick for intentional interference with Association insurance coverage. In response to the Association’s lawsuit, Kulick levied accusations against the Board in one of his anonymous Newsletters. In defense of Kulick’s claims, the Association (through counsel) prepared and circulated a letter (“Letter”) to each community member addressing Kulick’s specific allegations by denying Board misconduct and inviting the membership to view court filings in the pending matter. The Letter described Kulick’s most recent missive as a “reckless communication” containing “unfounded, inaccurate, and spiteful allegations” against the Association, Board, and the Association’s attorneys. It also contained details regarding the then-pending matter and the Association’s success in their preliminary injunction against Kulick. After the Letter was circulated, Kulick brought a lawsuit against the Association for defamation arising out of the Letter to the membership, among other causes of action.

The trial court dismissed Kulick’s case after the Association brought an Anti-SLAPP motion against the defamation claim (“SLAPP” stands for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation; such motions are designed to protect defendants who have been sued for acts in furtherance of a constitutionally protected right of free speech or petition). On appeal, the court found that the Letter constituted “protected activity” as a public writing (i.e. circulated to all members throughout the community) in connection with an issue of public interest – the ongoing controversy of the then-pending lawsuit between the Association and Kulick. Additionally, the court found that Kulick could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because “expressions of opinion that do not include or imply false factual assertions do not constitute actionable defamation,” among other reasons. For these reasons, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling against Kulick.

While the Kulick case did not ultimately address the anonymous nature of Kulick’s publications or the validity of the Association rule prohibiting them, Kulick raises important issues for associations to consider when confronted with homeowner publications, or association responses to them. While it is unclear to what extent associations can restrict member publications, such as the regulation of anonymous publications, the court in Kulick signaled an association’s ability to address specific member allegations in the public forum of the community. However, when addressing such claims, associations should be mindful of the content of these responses as certain communications are not permissible (e.g. false assertions of fact, etc.). Conversely, an association has rights against defamation published by its members and should address any member publications that defame the association, its board of directors, managing agent, or employees.

Additionally, associations should be vigilant regarding member publications that purport to be official association publications, or publications that are circulated that contain patently false information. Such publications can cause significant disruption in an association’s affairs if allowed to exist and perpetuate. Ultimately, while the line between permissible and actionable content is by no means clear and varies case by case, associations should be alert for member publications that contain clearly false assertions of fact or publications that purport to be official association communications. If you have concerns regarding member publications or appropriate association responses to them, association counsel should be contacted to review the material and discuss potential remedies to the extent they are available.

Although Kulick is an unpublished opinion, it provides an indication of how a future court may rule in a similar situation. When confronted with member publications, homeowners associations should consider whether the published content violates any association rules and regulations, whether it contains false assertions of fact, or whether the content purports to be or could be reasonably construed as an official association publication intended to mislead the recipients and/or members.

-Blog post authored by TLG Attorney, Tim D. Klubnikin, Esq.

Attorney’s Fees and Costs are not Available to a Moving Party who Secures Interim Injunctive Relief

Published on: March 6, 2018 | by Steven J. Tinnelly, Esq.

Court-Trial Preliminary injunctions are temporary court orders requested by one party that prevents another party from pursuing a particular course of conduct until the conclusion of a trial on the merits. A preliminary injunction is proper where the moving party proves the following two factors: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits at the time of trial; and (2) that relative interim harm to the parties from issuance of the injunction weighs in that party’s favor.

Occasionally, HOAs seek preliminary injunctions as a means to enforce the HOA’s governing documents. Among other reasons, the purpose behind that request for judicial relief is to restrain homeowner actions or omissions when such conduct potentially poses a threat of harm or risk to Association Property or the Association’s Members. Examples include a homeowner’s unauthorized alteration of structural common area components (e.g. removal of a bearing wall within a condominium unit; unapproved building activities on common area property).

Under the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (“Act”), at the conclusion of a trial on the merits, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in an action to enforce the HOA’s governing documents (Civil Code Section 5975). Historically, there has been some question as to whether a moving party may recover statutory attorney’s fees and costs if the court grants a preliminary injunction in a HOA enforcement action. In January 2018, the California Court of Appeal addressed that issue in the case of Artus v. Gramercy Towers Condominium Association (19 Cal.App.5^th 923).

Should an Association Retain Photo ID Cards?

Published on: February 13, 2018 | by Steven J. Tinnelly, Esq.

*Asked & Answered

Asked – Our HOA makes us take a photograph which they put on an ID card to use at the various amenities on site. Upon move out, they make us turn in the IDs. I found out that they don’t destroy the cards that have our name and photograph and what unit we are in. The HOA keeps it in the “unit file” in perpetuity. I don’t feel comfortable with this, but I turned mine and my husband’s in to avoid paying $25 each for not handing them in. My step-daughter has lost hers and I’m being charged $25. In finding out the fee does not go to defray any costs incurred by the board. This does not sound legal/in-line with privacy laws. Suggestions?

Answered – The HOA’s practice of retaining photo ID cards does not violate the law; however, the ID cards do not contain information that HOA’s are required to retain as HOA “records” such as copies of the HOA’s governing documents, minutes, financial records, and litigation files. There is no arguable reason for the HOA to retain photo ID’s of past members, so it would be our recommendation that rather than retain the photo ID cards the HOA shred them once they are surrendered, thereby preventing any opportunity for misuse of the information and photographs contained in the cards.

The charge of $25 for members who fail to turn in their ID cards upon moving out of the community is probably a penalty charge listed in the HOA’s Fine Schedule. As a fine, the charge is not required to be used to defray costs incurred by the HOA, but is a penalty designed to motivate members to surrender their cards, so they are not used for entrance to the HOA’s amenities by unauthorized individuals. The amount of the fine is not “unreasonable,” so it does not violate the Civil Code that governs homeowners associations.

Content provided by TLG attorney Terri A. Morris, Esq.

To submit questions to the HOA attorneys at Tinnelly Law Group, click here.

Requesting HOA Enforcement Held to be Constitutionally Protected Activity

Published on: January 2, 2018 | by Steven J. Tinnelly, Esq.

*New Case Law

A Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (or “SLAPP”) is a lawsuit brought to prevent or punish someone for exercising their First Amendment right to speak about public issues or to petition the government. In response to this abuse of the court system, California enacted Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, known as the “anti-SLAPP” statute. It allows a defendant against whom a SLAPP is brought to file a special motion to strike and, if granted, have the case dismissed and also recover his attorney’s fees.

In recent years we have seen situations where the anti-SLAPP statute has been triggered in homeowners association (“HOA”) disputes (i.e., statements made in connection with HOA Board elections). The 2017 case of Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community Association of Rancho Palos Verdes (9 Cal.App.5th 119) (Rolling Hills) is another example.

In Rolling Hills, the defendant homeowner, Liu, submitted an application to his HOA to invoke the HOA’s dispute resolution process against his neighbor, Colyear. Colyear refused to trim trees blocking Liu’s view, despite the fact that there was a protective covenant within the HOA’s governing documents designed to preserve views. In response, Colyear sued Liu and the HOA, alleging, among other things, that the covenant did not encumber Colyear’s property and that Liu and the HOA were wrongfully clouding title to Colyear’s property. Liu then withdrew his application and filed a special motion to strike Colyear’s claims under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court granted Liu’s motion.

The trial court’s ruling was affirmed on appeal. The Court of Appeals found that Liu’s application (his request for the HOA to commence enforcement efforts against Colyear) was made in furtherance of Liu’s exercise of the constitutional right of petition in connection with an issue of “public interest” under the anti-SLAPP statute. It rejected Colyear’s claims that Liu’s application was simply a private tree-trimming dispute between two (2) neighbors. Rather, it was a matter of public interest because (1) it affected the community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity, and (2) at the time Liu submitted his application, “there was an ongoing controversy, dispute or discussion regarding the applicability of the tree-trimming covenants…and the HOA’s authority to enforce [them].”

The holding in Rolling Hills is another in a continuing trend of cases were constitutional protections have intersected with HOA law, and where HOAs have been viewed by courts as “quasi-governments.”